This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Trade, expropriation and allocation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Antonio Quesada (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Allocation rules map preference profiles into allocations, whereas trading rules map preference profiles and allocations into allocations. It is shown that no allocation rule can derive from a trading rule based on voluntary trade and satisfying a weak efficiency condition. If the trading rule allows compulsory trade then the only allocation rules that can derive from a trading rule satisfying certain additional mild conditions are those having a hierarchy of dictators. These results contribute to accentuate the difference between centralized and decentralized allocation mechanisms.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0407/0407004.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0407004.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 05 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0407004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: Allocation rules; Compulsory trade; Hierarchy of dictators; Trading rules;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use IDEAS to provide links to papers and articles in your course syllabus.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.