A Model of Endogeneous Oil Spill Regulation

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A Model of Endogeneous Oil Spill Regulation

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Ayla Ogus (Izmir University of Economics)

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Ayla Ogus Binatli

Abstract

This paper presents a model of endogenous oil spill regulation where the severity of regulations is shown to be a function of the size of recent spills. The regulator chooses how much to regulate in order to maximize political capital when regulations are rigid downwards and the distribution of spills is not known with certainty. Very large spills are shown to cause large increases in the regulation level. In the event that an unlikely disastrous spill is realized, major regulatory reform may take place which would take the regulations to too high a level.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Others with number 0504004.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 08 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0504004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
NEP-ENE-2005-04-16 (Energy Economics)
NEP-POL-2005-04-16 (Positive Political Economics)
NEP-REG-2005-04-16 (Regulation)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Harris, Milton & Holstrom, Bengt, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 315-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Discussion Papers 488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sarin, Rakesh K. & Scherer, Charles R., 1976. "Optimal oil tanker size with regard to environmental impact of oil spills," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 226-235, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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