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The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills

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Author Info
Montserrat Grau
Theodore Groves

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Abstract

In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement efforts in reducing oil spills. We consider how vessel owners’ behavior changes with increases in the probability of being monitored. We also study the effectiveness of the performance standards adopted by the Coast Guard in 1984. We conclude that: (i) Coast Guard enforcement effort works to decrease both the frequency of oil spills and the spill size, even though in this latter case the effect is smaller; (ii) the expected fine has no effect on either the frequency or size of oil spills; (iii) few spills from non-monitored transfers are detected; and (iv) the implementation of the new performance standards increases the effectiveness of the Coast Guard monitoring efforts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1018343600621
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 315-339
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:10:y:1997:i:4:p:315-339

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Related research
Keywords: oil spills; enforcement and monitoring;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
  2. Cohen, Mark A., 1986. "The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Theodore Groves & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe & Montserrat Viladrich, 1992. "Optimal Monitoring of Oil Spills: Control in a Stochastic, Dynamic Context," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-48, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  4. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. kishore gawande & alok k. bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Law and Economics 0505001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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