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Looking Backwards, Looking Inwards: Priors and Introspection

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Author Info
Dov Samet (Faculty of Management Tel Aviv University)
Abstract

The three notions studied here are Bayesian priors, invariant priors and introspection. A prior for an agent is Bayesian, if it agrees with the agent's posterior beliefs when conditioned on them. A prior is invariant, if it is the average, with respect to itself, of the posterior beliefs. Finally, an agent is introspective, if he is certain of his own beliefs. We show that a prior is Bayesian, if and only if it is invariant, and the agent is almost surely introspective. We show how to edogenize priors, and how to express the events that an agent has a Bayesian or invariant prior. Finally, we study properties of the endogenized common prior.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9610007.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 15 Oct 1996
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610007

Note: Type of Document - Postscript ; prepared on Unix; pages: 13
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Related research
Keywords: Bayesian model; prior; common prior; type spaces; introspection;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet, 1996. "Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs," Game Theory and Information 9609002, EconWPA, revised 17 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  2. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  3. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dov Samet, 1997. "On the Triviality of High-Order Probabilistic Beliefs," Game Theory and Information 9705001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1998. "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited," Discussion Papers 1228, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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