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Perseverance, Information and Stochastically Stable Outcomes

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  • Murali Agastya

    (University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT)

Abstract

One bargainer from a finite population X, is matched at random with a bargainer from another finite population Y. They simultaneously precommit to "minimal" shares of a unit surplus. Populations differ in their degree of \underline{perseverance}, parameterized by $\lambda \in (0,1)$. If the players precommit to $x$ and $y$ such that $x+y\leq 1$, then player $i$ gets his demand $x_i$ as well as a fraction $\lambda_i$ of the unbargained surplus $(1-x-y)$. If $x+y>1$, they get nothing. When players play adaptively and sometimes make errors as in Young (1993b), in the long run, a single division of surplus is observed most often. This is close to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with the weights $(1-\lambda_x)$ and $(1-\lambda_y)$. The surprise here is that the population that seemingly does well in the one shot encounters loses in the long run.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9503002.

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Date of creation: 09 Mar 1995
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503002

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  1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  2. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  3. Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, EconWPA.
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