AbstractThe function of a social norm is to coordinate people`s expectations in interactions that possess multiple equilibria. Norms govern a wide range of phenomena, including property rights, contracts, bargains, forms of communication, and concepts of justice. Norms impose uniformity of behavior within a given social group, but often vary substantially among groups. Over time norm shifts may occur, prompted either by changes in objective circumstances or by subjective changes in perceptions and expectations. The dynamics of this process can be modeled using evolutionary game theory, which predict that some norms are more stable than others in the long run.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 307.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Norms; Institutions; Equilibrium Selection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-04-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-04-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2007-04-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-04-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-04-14 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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