Dynamic Tax Competition under Asymmetric Productivity of Public Capital
AbstractWe here expand the static tax competition models in symmetric small regions, which were indicated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), to a dynamic tax competition model in large regions, taking consideration of the regional asymmetry of productivity of public capital and the existence of capital accumulation. The aim of this paper is to verify how the taxation policy affects asymmetric equilibrium based on a simulation analysis using an overlapping generations model in two regions. It is assumed that the public capital as a public input is formed on the basis of the capital tax of local governments and the lump-sum tax of the central government. As demonstrated in related literature, the optimal capital tax rate should become zero when the lump-sum tax is imposed only on older generations, however, the optimal tax rate may become positive when it is imposed proportionally on younger and older generations. In the asymmetric equilibrium, several cooperative solutions can possibly exist which can achieve a higher welfare standard than the actualized cooperative solution either in Region1 or 2. JEL classification Ã”ÂºÃ¶ H21; H42; H71; H77; R13; R53 Keywords Ã”ÂºÃ¶ Tax competition, Capital taxation, Capital accumulation, Public inputs, Infrastructure
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number ersa10p1033.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
- R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2012-07-29 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2012-07-29 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-PBE-2012-07-29 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-07-29 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Wildasin, 2001.
"Fiscal Competition in Space and Time,"
- Wildasin, David E., 1988.
"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition,"
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Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
- Burgess, David F, 1988. "Complementarity and the Discount Rate for Public Investment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 527-41, August.
- Yakita, Akira, 1994. "Public investment criterion with distorted capital markets in an overlapping generations economy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 715-728.
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