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Fiscal Policies and Trade: On the existence of Nash equilibria

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  • Abderrahmane ZIAD

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS))

  • Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU

    (CNRS CES, Université de Paris 1, ENS Cachan)

Abstract

This paper studies the existence of a fiscal Nash equilibrium in a multi-country model of trade where the relative prices are the channels of transmission of scal policies between countries. We stipulate the necessary conditions on goods, consumptions and trade that allow for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the fiscal game. In the particular case of homotethic utility functions, we show that conditions on the shape and the degree of the curvature of the relative prices functions are sufficient to guarantee the existence of the Nash equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201112.

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Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201112

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Keywords: Fiscal policy; Trade; Nash equilibrium.;

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  1. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  2. Wildasin, D.E., 1987. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Francis Bloch & Unal Zenginobuz, 2007. "The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 199-216, November.
  4. Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2011. "On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 439-445, September.
  5. Wilson, John D., 1985. "Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-89, July.
  6. Sorensen, Jan Rose, 1996. " Coordination of Fiscal Policy among a Subset of Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(1), pages 111-18, March.
  7. Wong, Siu-kee, 2004. "Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 367-387, May.
  8. Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Ziad, Abderrahmanne, 2005. "Existence of equilibria in a basic tax-competition model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, January.
  9. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  10. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May.
  11. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
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