Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

How Reform Worked in China

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yingyi Qian

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    China's reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years. That China has managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of law and secure private property rights is puzzling. To understand how reform works in a developing and transition economy that has great growth potential, it is not enough to study the conventional "best-practice institutions" as a desirable goal. One should also study how feasible, imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the initial conditions and to function as stepping stones in the transition toward the goal. Underlying China's reform is a serial of institutional changes concerning the market, firms, and the government in the novel form of "transitional institutions." These institutions succeed when they achieve two objectives at the same time: to improve economic efficiency by unleashing the standard forces of incentives and competition on the one hand, and to make the reform a win-win game and thus interest compatible for those in power on the other.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp473.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 473.

    as in new window
    Length: 63 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2002-473

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 724 E. University Ave, Wyly Hall 1st Flr, Ann Arbor MI 48109
    Phone: 734 763-5020
    Fax: 734 763 5850
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: China; institution; reform; transition;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, . "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 97050, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    2. Che, Jiahua & Qian, Yingyi, 1998. "Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-23, April.
    3. Wong, Christine P. W. (ed.), 1997. "Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195900279, October.
    4. Rodrik, Dani, 2000. "Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are And How To Acquire Them," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Andrei Shleifer, 1996. "Government in Transition," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1783, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    6. Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott, 1996. "Technological change: Rediscovering the engine of productivity growth in China's rural economy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 337-369, May.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1995. "The design of reform packages under uncertainty," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9607, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1999. "From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 103-131, March.
    9. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1687-1737, December.
    10. Coase, Ronald H., 1991. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee 1991-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    11. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June.
    12. Bai, Chong-En & Li, David Daokui & Qian, Yingyi & Wang, Yijiang, 1999. "Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2221, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Li, David D., 1996. "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, August.
    14. David D. Li, 1996. "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 8, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    15. Groves, Theodore, et al, 1994. "Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(1), pages 183-209, February.
    16. Yingyi Qian, 1996. "Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(2), pages 427-447, October.
    17. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1234-47, November.
    18. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 703-30, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Institutions and Economic Performance - Fast-moving and Slow-moving Institutions," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(2), pages 16-21, October.
    2. Eggleston, Karen & Wang, Jian & Rao, Keqin, 2008. "From plan to market in the health sector?: China's experience," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-6), pages 400-412.
    3. Wang, Yuanyuan & You, Jing, 2012. "Corruption and firm growth: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 415-433.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2002-473. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laurie Gendron).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.