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Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?

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Author Info
Bai, Chong-En
Li, David Daokui
Qian, Yingyi
Wang, Yijiang

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Abstract

China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as the rule of law and separation of powers)to constrain the government from arbitrary intrusion into economic activities. We argue that one mechanism that has limited the government's ability for predation and harassment is commitment through information decentralization, where the key institution is "anonymous banking," that is, a combination of the use of cash for transactions and the use of anonymous savings deposits. Meanwhile, the government has benefitted from the improved private incentives by collecting quasi-fiscal revenues from the state banking system through "financial repression," a combination of controls on international capital flows with restrictions on domestic interest rates. We show that the major features of China's economy concerning its fiscal decline, financial deepening, and the sectoral dual-track can be better understood using this analytical framework.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2221.

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Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2221

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Related research
Keywords: Anonymous Banking; Financial Repression; Government Commitment; Government In Transition; Information Decentralization; Sectoral Dual-Track; State Predation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Arm's Length Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 275-95, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dewatripont, M & Maskin, E, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 541-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Huang, Yasheng, 2005. "Ownership biases and FDI in China: two provinces," Working papers 4537-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yingyi Qian, 2002. "How Reform Worked in China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 473, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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