Taking, Giving, and Impure Altruism in Dictator Games
AbstractWe show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1301.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Dictator Game; Impure Altruism; Taking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-05-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2013-05-05 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-05-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-05-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-05-05 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicholas Bardsley, 2008. "Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 122-133, June.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Philip J. Grossman & Catherine C. Eckel, 2012. "Giving versus Taking: A “Real Donation” Comparison of Warm Glow and Cold Prickle," Monash Economics Working Papers 40-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Philip J. Grossman & Catherine C. Eckel, 2012. "Giving versus Taking: A “Real Donation” Comparison of Warm Glow and Cold Prickle in a Context-Rich Environment," Monash Economics Working Papers 20-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
- Korenok, Oleg & Millner, Edward L. & Razzolini, Laura, 2013.
"Impure altruism in dictators' giving,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 1-8.
- James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
- Korenok, Oleg & Millner, Edward L. & Razzolini, Laura, 2012. "Are dictators averse to inequality?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 543-547.
- John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 482-493.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oleg Korenok).
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