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Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Nabanita Datta Gupta () (Danish National Centre for Social Research)
Leslie S Stratton () (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business)
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We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact institutions and social norms have on individuals' bargaining power within a household, hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples' time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.
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Paper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0806.
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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0806Contact details of provider: Postal: Box 844000, Richmond, VA 23284-4000 Phone: 804/828-1717 Web page: http://www.bus.vcu.edu/economics/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Time Use ; Power ; Leisure ; Institutions ; Norms ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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