Games with Many Players and Abstract Economies Permitting Differentiated Commodities, Clubs, and Public Goods
AbstractIn a seminal paper relating economic and game theoretic structures, Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrate that a game is a market game -- that is, a game derived from a finite-dimensional private goods exchange economy where all participants have continuous, concave utility functions. In this paper, to accommodate models of economies with public goods, clubs, indivisibilities, and other deviations from the classic model of Shapley and Shubik, we demonstrate an equivalence between homogeneous market games with many players, possibly all with different characteristics, and abstract economies permitting differentiated commodities, clubs, public goods, coalition production, unbounded short sales and other deviations from standard economic models. By a homogeneous market game we mean a game derived from a market where all individuals have the same concave and continuous utility function. We also demonstrate that the condition of small group effectiveness -- that small groups of players can realize almost all gains to collective activities -- is equivalent to the condition of asymptotic negligibility -- that small groups of players cannot have significant impacts on average payoff to large groups of players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0813.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html
Market games; cooperative games; large games; club economies; local public goods; differentiated commodities; abstract economies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Evstigneev, I.V. & Flam, S.D., 2000. "Sharing Nonconvex Costs," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1300, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 327-342, May.
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