Sharing Nonconvex Costs
AbstractThe paper analyses cooperative games with side payments. Each player facesa possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggreagate members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 1300.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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COOPERATIVE GAMES ; PRODUCTION GAMES ; CORE ALLOCATIONS ; LACK OF CONVEXITY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- S D Flåm & L Koutsougeras, 2005.
"Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core,"
The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
0512, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
- S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik & Koutsougeras, L., 2007. "Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core," Working Papers in Economics 04/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Borglin, Anders & Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2007.
"Risk exchange as a market or production game,"
Working Papers in Economics
09/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Flam, Sjur & Jourani, A., 2006.
"Prices and Pareto Optima,"
2006:6, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Flam, S.D. & Jourani, A., 2000. "Prices and Pareto Optima," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0800, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2011.
"Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks,"
Working Papers in Economics
09/06, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2002. "Balanced Environmental Games," Working Papers in Economics 17/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Flåm, S. D. & Ermoliev, Y. M., 2009.
"Investment, uncertainty, and production games,"
Environment and Development Economics,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 51-66, February.
- S D Flåm & O Godal, 2005. "Affine Price Expectations and Equilibrium in Strategic Markets," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0505, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik & Jongen, Hubertus Th. & Stein, Oliver, 2007. "Slopes of Shadow Prices and Lagrange Multipliers," Working Papers in Economics 05/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Games with Many Players and Abstract Economies Permitting Differentiated Commodities, Clubs, and Public Goods," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0813, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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