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Balanced Environmental Games

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Abstract

Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific, computable core solution comes in terms of shadow prices on the said aggregates. Such prices may, in large part, implement the cooperative treaty by clearing a competitive market for emissions.

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  • Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2002. "Balanced Environmental Games," Working Papers in Economics 17/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2002_017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Evstigneev, I.V. & Flam, S.D., 2000. "Sharing Nonconvex Costs," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1300, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    2. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175, Springer.
    3. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1977. "The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1589-1594, October.
    4. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    5. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1971. "External economies and cores," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 182-188, June.
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    7. Carsten Helm, 2001. "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 141-146.
    8. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Games; Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distribution Effects; Employment Effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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