Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals?
AbstractConsider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly. Individuals are split into two types, the dominant and the dominated. We look for conditions under which welfare and inequality quasi-orders established at the household level still hold at the individual one. A necessary and sufficient condition for the Generalized Lorenz test is that the income of dominated individuals is a concave function of the household income: individuals of poor households have to stand more together than individuals of rich households. This property also proves to be crucial for the preservation of the Relative and Absolute Lorenz criteria, when the more egalitarian distribution is the poorest. Extensions to individuals heterogeneous in needs and more than two types are also provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 432.
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Lorenz dominance; Intra-household inequality; concavity; sharing rule;
Other versions of this item:
- Peluso, Eugenio & Trannoy, Alain, 2007. "Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 568-578, March.
- Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Does Less Inequality among Households Mean Less Inequality among Individuals?," IDEP Working Papers 0407, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jun 2004.
- Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals ?," THEMA Working Papers 2004-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-02 (All new papers)
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