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Consumer Cooperatives and Welfare in a Mixed Oligopoly

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Author Info

  • Marco Marini

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Urbino "Carlo Bo".)

  • Alberto Zevi

    ()
    (University of Rome "La Sapienza".)

Abstract

Consumer co-operatives constitute a highly successful example of democratic forms of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually organized as medium or large-scale firms competing with profit seeking firms in retail industries. In this paper we model such a situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer co-operatives maximize consumer-members' utilities and distribute them a patronage rebate on their goods purchase. We show that when consumers possess quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically differentiated goods and firms operate with a linear technology, the presence of consumer co-operatives positively a¤ects all industries output and social welfare. The effect of Co-ops on welfare is shown to be more significant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_10_10.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini in its series Working Papers with number 1010.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision: 2010
Handle: RePEc:urb:wpaper:10_10

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Web page: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/
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Related research

Keywords: Consumer Co-operatives; Profit-maximizing Firms; Mixed Oligopoly.;

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  1. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
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Cited by:
  1. Marco Marini & Alberto Zevi, 2011. "‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 239-263, November.

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