This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Carlo Scarpa (University of Brescia)
Giacomo Calzolari (University of Bologna)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is (socially) desirable, unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies of scope.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2009.55.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.55Contact details of provider: Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan Phone: 0039-2-52036934 Fax: 0039-2-52036946 Email: Web page: http://www.feem.it/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (barbara racah).
Keywords: Regulation ; Competition ; Asymmetric Information ; Conglomerate Firms ; Multiutility ; Scope Economies ; Informational Externality ; Find related papers by JEL classification: L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Myerson, Roger B., 1982.
"Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sappington, David E. M., 2003.
"Regulating horizontal diversification ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 291-315, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Leggio, Karyl B & Lien, Donald, 2000.
"Mergers in the Electric Utility Industry in a Deregulatory Environment ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 69-85, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Iossa, Elisabetta, 1999.
"Informative Externalities and Pricing in Regulated Multiproduct Industries ,"
Journal of Industrial Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2), pages 195-219, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brennan, Timothy J & Palmer, Karen, 1994.
"Comparing the Costs and Benefits of Diversification by Regulated Firms ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 115-36, May.
de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990.
" Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly ,"
Journal of Economic Surveys ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006.
"On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005.
"On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting ,"
Discussion Papers
1404, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004.
"On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting ,"
Discussion Papers
1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Alessandro Pavan, 2004.
"On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting ,"
Theory workshop papers
658612000000000067, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1989.
"An Informational Effect When Regulated Firms Enter Unregulated Markets ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 35-45, March.
Berry, S Keith, 2000.
"Excess Returns in Electric Utility Mergers during Transition to Competition ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 175-88, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Vickers, John, 1995.
"Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sakai, Yasuhiro, 1985.
"The value of information in a simple duopoly model ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 36-54, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brennan, Timothy J, 1990.
"Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by Regulated Monopolists ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 37-51, March.
Calzolari, Giacomo, 2001.
"The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 191-211, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Giovanni Fraquelli & Massimiliano Piacenza & Davide Vannoni, 2004.
"Scope and scale economies in multi-utilities: evidence from gas, water and electricity combinations ,"
Applied Economics ,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 36(18), pages 2045-2057, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .