Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship
AbstractPrevious studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidence and discuss implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 370.
Date of creation: Jan 1999
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Experiment; fairness; labor relations; self-serving bias; Leex;
Other versions of this item:
- Charness, Gary B & Haruvy, Ernan, 1999. "Self-Serving Biases: Evidence From A Simulated Labour Relationship," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vs8w2k7, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-1999-07-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-1999-07-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LTV-1999-09-01 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
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