Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidence and discuss implications.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number
370.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
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MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998.
"Motivation and Markets,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June.
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