On Sharing the Benefits of Communication
AbstractWe put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit fromcommunicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common.Learning languages is costly. In this setting no individually rational and feasible Grovesmechanism exists. We characterize the best-in-class feasible Groves mechanism and thebest-in-class individually rational Groves mechanism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 016.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
public economics ;
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