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On Sharing the Benefits of Communication

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Author Info

  • Athanasiou Efthymios
  • Dey Santanu
  • Valletta Giacomo

    (METEOR)

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    Abstract

    We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit fromcommunicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common.Learning languages is costly. In this setting no individually rational and feasible Grovesmechanism exists. We characterize the best-in-class feasible Groves mechanism and thebest-in-class individually rational Groves mechanism.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 016.

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    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012016

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    Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht
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    Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
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    Related research

    Keywords: public economics ;

    References

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    1. Ginsburgh, Victor & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio & Weber, Shlomo, 2007. "Learning foreign languages: Theoretical and empirical implications of the Selten and Pool model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(3-4), pages 337-347.
    2. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
    3. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
    4. McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April.
    5. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    6. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
    7. Jeffrey Church & Ian King, 1993. "Bilingualism and Network Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 337-45, May.
    8. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
    9. Bailey, Martin J, 1997. " The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 107-26, April.
    10. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
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