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Ranking schools: a step toward increased accountability or a mere discriminatory practice?

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Listed:
  • Ana Balcao Reis
  • Carmo Seabra
  • Luis C. Nunes

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of the effects of published school rankings based on average scores obtained by students on national exams. We study the effectiveness of this (low-stakes) accountability mechanism; we analyze whether students react to these rankings, by moving in or out of high-schools according to their scores and examine the movements of closing of schools. Our results suggest that families react strongly to published rankings. We also look at the changes in the socio-economic background of students of poorly performing schools in order to evaluate whether the publication of rankings has increased inequality, as feared by many observers. According to our results, published rankings do in fact reinforce stratification by income.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Balcao Reis & Carmo Seabra & Luis C. Nunes, 2012. "Ranking schools: a step toward increased accountability or a mere discriminatory practice?," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp567, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp567
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
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    3. Julie Berry Cullen & Randall Reback, 2006. "Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System," NBER Working Papers 12286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hanley Chiang, "undated". "How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement," Mathematica Policy Research Reports c58a3b537e324447b94a2bd41, Mathematica Policy Research.
    5. repec:mpr:mprres:6364 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor & Roger Aliaga Diaz, 2004. "Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 251-271.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    School accountability; school rankings;

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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