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Linking Decisions with Moments

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  • Róbert Veszteg

    ()
    (School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra)

Abstract

This paper proposes a mechanism that can be operated without money in situations where agents have to decide over some common projects when they are not informed about others' preferences. The success of the mechanisms proposed in the literature to deal with similar problems usually relies on the assumption that the entire probability distribution that describes uncertainty is common knowledge. This modified linking mechanism requires the knowledge of solely two moment conditions. It proves to be a useful tool for achieving efficiency improvements in public decision problems. Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005] offer the study of the so-called linking mechanism. Here I show that, while allowing for heterogeneity among problems and agents, the linking mechanism keeps its asymptotic properties when run with solely two moment conditions.

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File URL: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom/files/workingpapersmodule/@random437a056c22796/1132674654_wp1005.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 10/05.

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Length: 21 pages pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1005

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Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom

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  1. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
  2. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
  3. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg, 2008. "Minority vs. Majority: An Experimental Study of Standardized Bids," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0708, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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