Linking Decisions with Moments
AbstractThis paper proposes a mechanism that can be operated without money in situations where agents have to decide over some common projects when they are not informed about others' preferences. The success of the mechanisms proposed in the literature to deal with similar problems usually relies on the assumption that the entire probability distribution that describes uncertainty is common knowledge. This modified linking mechanism requires the knowledge of solely two moment conditions. It proves to be a useful tool for achieving efficiency improvements in public decision problems. Jackson and Sonnenschein  offer the study of the so-called linking mechanism. Here I show that, while allowing for heterogeneity among problems and agents, the linking mechanism keeps its asymptotic properties when run with solely two moment conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 10/05.
Length: 21 pages pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
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