Measuring US Presidents Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline between 1920 and 2008
AbstractWe propose a theoretical method to catch politicians' fiscal attitude concerning deficits and debt based on the analysis of the political discourse. We describe the methodological steps used to obtain it. The methodology is applied to the case of US President during the period 1920 to 2008. The results can be exploited in order to better understand the formation and the evolution of fiscal preferences and their influence on fiscal performance. As the index is based on normative and positive attitudes about deficits, their analysis can show the presence of strategic political behavior, giving thus a way to test some theoretical models on budgetary political behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 01/09.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 18 Jan 2009
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom
fiscal discipline; fiscal conservatism; political attitude; discourse analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
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