Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Guard Labor: An Essay in Honor of Pranab Bardhan

Contents:

Author Info

  • Samuel Bowles

    () (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

  • Arjun Jayadev

    () (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Abstract

We explore the exercise of power in perpetuating status quo institutions. We give empirical examples of the economic importance of power and offer a definition of this elusive term. We then investigate the role of power in a modern capitalist economy, borrowing ideas from the classical economists (unproductive labor, profit-driven investment), Marx (the labor-disciplining effect of unemployment) and the contemporary theory of incomplete contracts(the role of monitoring and enforcement rents). Our model suggests that a significant portion of an economy's productive potential may be devoted to the exercise of power and to the perpetuation of social relationships of domination and subordination. We then measure these resources in labor units using the concept of guard labor, finding it to be a significant and growing fraction of the U.S. labor force. We also document substantial cross national differences in the extent of guard labor and the strong statistical association between the extent of income inequality and the fraction of the labor force that is constituted by guard labor. We close with some speculations concerning the role of guard labor in the process of economic development and how economies might function better with more carrot and less stick.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/2004-15.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers with number 2004-15.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2004-15

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Thompson Hall, Amherst, MA 01003
Phone: (413)545-2512
Fax: (413)545-2921
Email:
Web page: http://www.umass.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: enforcement rents; institutions; guard labor; supervision; social conflict; labor-management;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  3. Gordon, David M, 1994. "Bosses of Different Stripes: A Cross-National Perspective on Monitoring and Supervision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 375-79, May.
  4. Raphael, Steven & Winter-Ember, Rudolf, 2001. "Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 259-83, April.
  5. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis., 1988. "Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory," Economics Working Papers 8876, University of California at Berkeley.
  6. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis., 1998. "Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints and Economic Performance," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-097, University of California at Berkeley.
  8. Roger Myerson & Serguey Braguinsky, 2005. "Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment," 2005 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "On the Nature of Fair Behavior," IEW - Working Papers 017, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. Arjun Jayadev, . "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.
  11. Marcel Fafchamps & Måns Söderbom, 2004. "Wages and Labor Management in African Manufacturing," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-02, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  12. Schor, Juliet B & Bowles, Samuel, 1987. "Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 584-92, November.
  13. Basu, Kaushik, 2000. "Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296713, September.
  14. Bowles, Samuel, 1986. "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1203-04, December.
  15. Marcel Fafchamps & Måns Söderbom, 2004. "Wages and Labor Management in African Manufacturing," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 551-572, June.
  17. Toufique, Kazi Ali, 1997. "Some observations on power and property rights in the inland fisheries of Bangladesh," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 457-467, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Anti-Star Trek: A Theory of Posterity
    by Peter Frase in peter frase on 2010-12-14 16:27:31
  2. Future legends
    by Rob Horning in Marginal Utility (Tom Bozzo) (The New Inquiry) on 2012-06-15 18:39:08
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Arjun Jayadev, . "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2004-15

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fidan Kurtulus).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.