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Guard Labor: An Essay in Honor of Pranab Bardhan

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Author Info
Samuel Bowles () (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
Arjun Jayadev () (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

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Abstract

We explore the exercise of power in perpetuating status quo institutions. We give empirical examples of the economic importance of power and offer a definition of this elusive term. We then investigate the role of power in a modern capitalist economy, borrowing ideas from the classical economists (unproductive labor, profit-driven investment), Marx (the labor-disciplining effect of unemployment) and the contemporary theory of incomplete contracts(the role of monitoring and enforcement rents). Our model suggests that a significant portion of an economy's productive potential may be devoted to the exercise of power and to the perpetuation of social relationships of domination and subordination. We then measure these resources in labor units using the concept of guard labor, finding it to be a significant and growing fraction of the U.S. labor force. We also document substantial cross national differences in the extent of guard labor and the strong statistical association between the extent of income inequality and the fraction of the labor force that is constituted by guard labor. We close with some speculations concerning the role of guard labor in the process of economic development and how economies might function better with more carrot and less stick.

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Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004-15.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2004-15

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Related research
Keywords: enforcement rents; institutions; guard labor; supervision; social conflict; labor-management;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
P50 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
N32 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Income, and Wealth - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  7. Arjun Jayadev, . "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  8. Schor, Juliet B & Bowles, Samuel, 1987. "Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 584-92, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bowles, Samuel, 1986. "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1203-04, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Bardhan, Pranab & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and economic performance," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 541-603 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Marcel Fafchamps & Måns Söderbom, 2004. "Wages and Labor Management in African Manufacturing," Development and Comp Systems 0409043, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Toufique, Kazi Ali, 1997. "Some observations on power and property rights in the inland fisheries of Bangladesh," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 457-467, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. Arjun Jayadev, . "Estimating Guard Labor," Working Papers 7, University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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