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Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences

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Author Info
Onur B. Celik (University of Connecticut)
Vicki Knoblauch (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple one-to-one matching problem.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2007-16.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-16.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-16

Note: The authors would like to thank Fusun Yaman for programming assistance and James Boudreau for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
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Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: Two-Sided Matching; Correlated preferences; Gale-Shapley algorithm;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vicki Knoblauch, 2007. "Marriage Matching: A Conjecture of Donald Knuth," Working papers 2007-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E. & Unver, M. Utku, 2006. "The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 457-486, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Chen, Yan & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "School choice: an experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 202-231, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Mongell, Susan & Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 441-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James W. Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2008. "Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences," Working papers 2008-27, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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