In this paper we study the implementation of policy incentives aimed at increasing the research output at European public universities by university managers and public administrations. Although public universities are subject to significant management rigidities, we provide some interesting policies aimed at increasing their research output. We pay special attention to the principal agent problem between professors and university managers due to the career options that professors face outside the university.
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Paper provided by Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada in its series DEA Working Papers with number
24.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison, 2003.
"Dry Holes in Economic Research,"
Kyklos,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 161-173, 05.
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