Physician Dual Practice: Access Enhancement or Demand Inducement?
AbstractIn many developing countries, the majority of physicians employed in government clinics also have a private practice. We develop a simple model to show that allowing dual practice helps low-income governments retain skilled physicians to assure patient access. If dual-practice providers differentially refer higher-income patients to private practice, public funding becomes more effectively targeted on the poor. Yet dual practice physicians may also skimp on effort, pilfer supplies, and induce demand. Patterns of care-seeking in Indonesia, especially disproportionate use of private providers by the urban poor, are consistent with exacerbated incentive for physician self-referral to private practice in urban areas.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Tufts University in its series Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University with number 0311.
Date of creation: 2003
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2003-06-04 (Education)
- NEP-HEA-2003-06-04 (Health Economics)
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