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A Functional Estimation Approach to the First-Price Auction Models

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  • Florens, Jean-Pierre
  • Enache, Andreea
  • Sbaï, Erwann

Abstract

This paper introduces new methods of identification and estimation of the first-price sealed bid auction model and compares them with the previous existing ones.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Florens, Jean-Pierre & Enache, Andreea & Sbaï, Erwann, 2021. "A Functional Estimation Approach to the First-Price Auction Models," TSE Working Papers 21-1264, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:126172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
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    4. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2012. "Quantile-based nonparametric inference for first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(2), pages 345-357.
    5. Véronique Flambard & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1014-1036, October.
    6. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November.
    7. Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
    8. Zincenko, Federico, 2018. "Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 205(2), pages 303-335.
    9. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2009. "Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1193-1227, July.
    10. Babii, Andrii, 2020. "Honest Confidence Sets In Nonparametric Iv Regression And Other Ill-Posed Models," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 658-706, August.
    11. Brent R. Hickman & Timothy P. Hubbard, 2015. "Replacing Sample Trimming with Boundary Correction in Nonparametric Estimation of First‐Price Auctions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 739-762, August.
    12. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2002. "Structural Estimation of the Affliated Private Value Auction Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 171-193, Summer.
    13. Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2018. "Nonparametric Estimation for Regulation Models," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 131, pages 45-58.
    14. Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2021. "Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(10), pages 944-982, November.
    15. Campo, Sandra, 2012. "Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification, estimation and application to construction procurements," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 96-107.
    16. Elodie Guerre & I. Perrigne & Q.H. Vuong, 2000. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [[Estimation nonparamétrique optimale des enchères au premier prix]]," Post-Print hal-02697497, HAL.
    17. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207.
    18. Yao Luo & Yuanyuan Wan, 2018. "Integrated-Quantile-Based Estimation for First-Price Auction Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(1), pages 173-180, January.
    19. Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2020. "Identification and Estimation in a Third-Price Auction Model," Post-Print hal-02929530, HAL.
    20. Hubbard, Timothy P. & Li, Tong & Paarsch, Harry J., 2012. "Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliation," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 4-16.
    21. V. Flambard & I. Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in procurement auctions: some evidence from snow removal contracts," Post-Print hal-00323914, HAL.
    22. Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2019. "Econometrics of Auctions and Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 27-54, August.
    23. Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre, 2020. "Identification And Estimation In A Third-Price Auction Model," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 386-409, June.
    24. An, Yonghong & Hu, Yingyao & Shum, Matthew, 2010. "Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 328-341, August.
    25. Carrasco, Marine & Florens, Jean-Pierre & Renault, Eric, 2007. "Linear Inverse Problems in Structural Econometrics Estimation Based on Spectral Decomposition and Regularization," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 77, Elsevier.
    26. J. P. Florens & J. S. Racine & S. Centorrino, 2018. "Nonparametric instrumental variable derivative estimation," Journal of Nonparametric Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2), pages 368-391, April.
    27. M. Jones, 1992. "Estimating densities, quantiles, quantile densities and density quantiles," Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Springer;The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, vol. 44(4), pages 721-727, December.
    28. Gimenes, Nathalie & Guerre, Emmanuel, 2022. "Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 224-247.
    29. Gagliardini, Patrick & Scaillet, Olivier, 2012. "Tikhonov regularization for nonparametric instrumental variable estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 61-75.
    30. Fève, Frédérique & Florens, Jean-Pierre, 2014. "Iterative algorithm for non parametric estimation of the instrumental variables quantiles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 300-304.
    31. Rosa L. Matzkin, 2013. "Nonparametric Identification in Structural Economic Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 457-486, May.
    32. Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
    33. Gentry, Matthew L. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Nekipelov, Denis & Paarsch, Harry J., 2018. "Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review," Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, now publishers, vol. 9(2-4), pages 79-302, April.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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