Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information
AbstractThis paper studies identification for a broad class of empirical games in a general functional setting. Global identification results are known for some specific models, for instance in some standard auction models. We use functional formulations to obtain general criteria for local identification. These criteria can be applied to both parametric and nonparametric models, as well as models with asymmetry among players and affiliated private information. A benchmark model is developed where the structural parameters of interest are the distribution of private information and an additional dissociated parameter, such as a parameter of risk aversion. Criteria are derived for some standard auction models, games with exogenous variables, games with randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, and games with strategic functions that cannot be derived analytically.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 612.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Econometric Theory, vol.�26, n°6, 2010, p.�1638-1662.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89
Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37
Web page: http://www.idei.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbaï, Erwann, 2010. "Local Identification In Empirical Games Of Incomplete Information," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(06), pages 1638-1662, December.
- Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbaï, Erwann, 2009. "Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information," TSE Working Papers 10-166, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.