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Bayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctions

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Author Info

  • Kumbhakar, Subal C.
  • Parmeter, Christopher F.
  • Tsionas, Efthymios G.

Abstract

This paper considers Bayesian estimation strategies for first-price auctions within the independent private value paradigm. We develop an ‘optimization’ error approach that allows for estimation of values assuming that observed bids differ from optimal bids. We further augment this approach by allowing systematic over or underbidding by bidders using ideas from the stochastic frontier literature. We perform a simulation study to showcase the appeal of the method and apply the techniques to timber auction data collected in British Columbia. Our results suggest that significant underbidding is present in the timber auctions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Econometrics.

Volume (Year): 168 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 47-59

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Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:168:y:2012:i:1:p:47-59

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeconom

Related research

Keywords: Posterior distribution; Bidding strategy; Markov Chain Monte Carlo; Stochastic frontier; Gibbs sampling;

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References

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  1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July.
  2. Koop, Gary & Osiewalski, Jacek & Steel, Mark F. J., 1997. "Bayesian efficiency analysis through individual effects: Hospital cost frontiers," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1-2), pages 77-105.
  3. Subal Kumbhakar & Christopher Parmeter, 2009. "The effects of match uncertainty and bargaining on labor market outcomes: evidence from firm and worker specific estimates," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 1-14, February.
  4. Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
  5. Richard Hofler & John List, 2004. "Valuation on the frontier: Calibrating actual and hypothetical statements of value," Framed Field Experiments 00159, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Sareen, Samita, 2003. "Reference Bayesian inference in nonregular models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 265-288, April.
  7. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  8. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. J. Griffin & M. Steel, 2008. "Flexible mixture modelling of stochastic frontiers," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 33-50, February.
  10. Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
  11. Eric T. Bradlow & Young-Hoon Park, 2007. "Bayesian Estimation of Bid Sequences in Internet Auctions Using a Generalized Record-Breaking Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 218-229, 03-04.
  12. Jim Griffin & Mark Steel, 2005. "Bayesian Stochastic Frontier Analysis Using WinBUGS," Econometrics 0509004, EconWPA.
  13. Michael K. Price, 2008. "Using The Spatial Distribution Of Bidders To Detect Collusion In The Marketplace: Evidence From Timber Auctions," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 399-417.
  14. van den Broeck, Julien & Koop, Gary & Osiewalski, Jacek & Steel, Mark F. J., 1994. "Stochastic frontier models : A Bayesian perspective," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 273-303, April.
  15. Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 517-567, August.
  16. Donald, Stephen G & Paarsch, Harry J, 1993. "Piecewise Pseudo-maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 121-48, February.
  17. Flinn, C. & Heckman, J., 1982. "New methods for analyzing structural models of labor force dynamics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 115-168, January.
  18. Sareen, Samita, 1999. "Posterior Odds Comparison of a Symmetric Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction within the Common-Value and the Independent-Private-Values Paradigms," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 651-76, Nov.-Dec..
  19. Kumbhakar, Subal C. & Tsionas, Efthymios G., 2005. "Measuring technical and allocative inefficiency in the translog cost system: a Bayesian approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 355-384, June.
  20. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
  21. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
  22. Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Ferona, Angeliki & Tsionas, Efthymios G., 2012. "Measurement of excess bidding in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 377-380.

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