I attempt to decide, using the posterior odds ratio, whether the symmetric common-value paradigm or the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is a more probable explanation of the low-price, sealed-bid auctions conducted by the Indian Oil Corporation to purchase crude-oil from the international market. The estimation approach is structural parametric. The auctions are modelled as static non-cooperative games of incomplete information with risk neutral bidders. I conclude that the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is more probable.
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Volume (Year): 14 (1999) Issue (Month): 6 (Nov.-Dec.) Pages: 651-76 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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