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Competition and Collusion in Grain Markets: Basmati Auctions in North India

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  • A Banerji
  • J.V. Meenakshi
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    Abstract

    Many small wholesale grain markets in India are characterized by large numbers of sellers and a relatively small number of buyers, thereby lending the price formation process open to manipulation through collusion. Government intervention limits the extent of such manipulation through the institution of regulated markets, where the rules of exchange are clearly spelled out and the price formation process is transparent. Unfortunately, recent studies that document how agricultural markets operate—especially in Northern India—and the extent to which they hinder or serve farmers, are rare. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by studying the functioning of a regulated basmati paddy market in the state of Haryana in North India. [Working Paper No. 91]

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:2701.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2701

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    Keywords: Wholesale; grain markets; manipulation; price formation; transparent; agricultural markets; basmati; paddy markets;

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    1. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1997. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," NBER Working Papers 6037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jha, Raghbendra & Murthy, K.V.B. & Nagarajan, Hari K. & Seth, Ashok, 1999. "Components of the wholesale bid-ask spread and the structure of grain markets: the case of rice in India," Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 21(2), October.
    3. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
    4. Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H., 1999. "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions," RCER Working Papers 463, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    5. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
    6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Sareen, Samita, 1999. "Posterior Odds Comparison of a Symmetric Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction within the Common-Value and the Independent-Private-Values Paradigms," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 651-76, Nov.-Dec..
    8. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    9. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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