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Einkommensdifferenziale zwischen Bachelor- und Diplomabsolventen - Humankapital oder Signal?

Author

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  • Verena Dill
  • Anke Hammen

Abstract

Descriptive statistics show that a wage differential between graduates of the newly introduced bachelor programme and those of the traditional so called diplom programme of 7200 EUR per anno exists (Briedis/Minks 2005b). How can we explain this gap? Economic theory offers two contrary theories: human capital and signalling. Both theories claim a positive correlation of education and earnings. However, the theo- ries differ concerning the causal effect of this relationship. In order to determine which theory better explains the observed wage gap, we use the so-called Bologna-Reform (the process of restructuring from diplom- to bachelor-graduates) as a quasi- experimental setting. Our study shows that signalling effects are dominant when ex- amining tertiary education in Germany.

Suggested Citation

  • Verena Dill & Anke Hammen, 2011. "Einkommensdifferenziale zwischen Bachelor- und Diplomabsolventen - Humankapital oder Signal?," Research Papers in Economics 2011-04, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:trr:wpaper:201104
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Garibaldi, Pietro, 2006. "Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199280674.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signalling; human capital; German tertiary education; Bologna-Process;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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