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Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts

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Author Info
Kelly Bedard
Abstract

Under the educational sorting hypothesis, an environment in which some individuals are constrained from entering university will be characterized by increased pooling at the high school graduation level, as compared to an environment with greater university access. This results because some potential high school dropouts and university enrollees choose the high school graduate designation in order to take advantage of high-ability individuals who are constrained from entering university. This is in stark contrast to human capital theory, which predicts higher university enrollment but identical high school dropout rates in regions with greater university access. I test the contradictory high school dropout predictions of the human capital and signaling models using NLSYM and NLSYW education data from the late 1960s and early 1970s. I find that labor markets that contain universities have higher high school dropout rates. This result is consistent with a signaling model and inconsistent with a pure human capital model.

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 109 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 749-775
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:4:p:749-775

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  1. Tali Regev, 2007. "Imperfect information, self-selection and the market for higher education," Working Paper Series 2007-18, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paul Willen & Igal Hendel & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Educational Opportunity and Income Inequality," NBER Working Papers 10879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2005. "Escaping Mass Education – Why Harvard Pays," Working Papers 2005:2, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert Dur, 2006. "Status-Seeking in Violent Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-005/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Dur, 2006. "Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Habermalz, Steffen, 2003. "Job Matching and the Returns to Educational Signals," IZA Discussion Papers 726, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Marc Gurgand & Eric Maurin, 2007. "A large scale experiment: wages and educational expansion in France," PSE Working Papers 2007-21, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  9. Lari Arthur Viianto, 2007. "On The Positive Effects Of Taxation On Education," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  10. Strobl, Eric, 2003. "Is Education Used as a Signaling Device for Productivity in Developing Countries? Evidence from Ghana," IZA Discussion Papers 683, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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