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Ethical altruism and redistribution: an experimental approach

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  • Luigi Mittone

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is on altruism and coordination among agents with different income levels. A special form of altruism (ethical altruism) is investigated by means of experiments. The definition of altruism here used takes the hint by the A. Sen’s concept of obligation, i.e. behaviours that produce advantage to someone whose welfare is not important at all for the agent’s wellbeing. In this sense this paper investigate on altruism without reciprocity. A second hypothesis here investigated is that the degree of extent of the ethical altruism is influenced by gender and by income differences within the population.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0301.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:0301

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Cited by:
  1. Luigi Mittone, 2003. "Altruism without reciprocation in children," CEEL Working Papers 0302, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

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