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Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools

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  • Schmidt, Klaus M.

Abstract

Technological standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare increasing patent pools.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 342.

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Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:342

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Keywords: Patent pools; standard setting organisations; innovation; complements problem; patent thicket;

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  1. Dequiedt, V. & Versaevel, B., 2004. "Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) 200412, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  2. Anne Layne-Farrar & Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2012. "Payments And Participation: The Incentives To Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts," Working Papers, CEMFI wp2012_1203, CEMFI.
  3. Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University d04-32, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2005. "Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G," IIR Working Paper, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University 05-01, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.
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Cited by:
  1. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.

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