Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries under the New Deal
AbstractPatent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents, have emerged as a prominent mechanism to resolve litigation when multiple firms own patents for the same technology. This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools on innovation within 20 industries. Difference-in-differences regressions imply a 16 percent decline in patenting in response to the creation of a pool. This decline is driven by technology fields in which a pool combined patents for substitute technologies by competing firms, suggesting that unregulated pools may discourage innovation by weakening competition to improve substitutes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18316.
Date of creation: Aug 2012
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- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
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- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-08-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2012-08-23 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2012-08-23 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2012-08-23 (Law & Economics)
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