Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D

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Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D

Author Info

Dequiedt, V.
Versaevel, B.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Vianney Dequiedt

Abstract

Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale fo their respective licences. In this paper the authors analyse their consequences on the speed of the sale of their respective licences. In this papier, they analyze their consequences on the speed of the innovation process. They adopt an ex ante prespective and study the impact of possible pool formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a bonus reward on R&D activity, they show that a firm's investment pattern is upward sloping over time before pool formation, and decreases afterwards. The smaller the set of initial contributors, the higher this effect. A pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptant / refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations and lead to a delayed clearance date, that is suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint.

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Paper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200412.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200412

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Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Bruno Versaevel & Vianney Dequiedt, 2007. "Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D," Working Papers 0703, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
- Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel, 2007. "Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D," Post-Print halshs-00142497_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

References listed on IDEAS
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Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1981. "Dynamic games of innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 21-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., . "Dynamic Games of Innovation," Working Papers 287, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Efficient Patent Pools," IDEI Working Papers 211, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Efficient Patent Pools," NBER Working Papers 9175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d04-32, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Reiko Aoki; Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 788, Econometric Society.
Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Green, J.R. & Scotchmer, S., 1993. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1638, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Law and Economics 0303005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Carl Shapiro, 2004. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000539, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series CPC00-011, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-42, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dosi, Giovanni, 1988. "Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 1120-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 581-593, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs," NBER Working Papers 1658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Discussion Paper 222, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

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