Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dequiedt, V.
  • Versaevel, B.

Abstract

Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale fo their respective licences. In this paper the authors analyse their consequences on the speed of the sale of their respective licences. In this papier, they analyze their consequences on the speed of the innovation process. They adopt an ex ante prespective and study the impact of possible pool formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a bonus reward on R&D activity, they show that a firm's investment pattern is upward sloping over time before pool formation, and decreases afterwards. The smaller the set of initial contributors, the higher this effect. A pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptant / refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations and lead to a delayed clearance date, that is suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/Docs/pub/A2004/gael2004-12.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200412.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200412

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1241 rue des Résidences, Domaine Universitaire, 38400 Saint Martin d'Hères
Phone: (0033) 4 76 82 54 39
Email:
Web page: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: LICENSING; R&D RACES; INNOVATION; COMPETITIION POLICY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gilbert, Richard, 2004. "Converging Doctrines? US and EU Antitrust Policy for the Licensing of Intellectual Property," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt7j60d3r2, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
  3. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-42, June.
  4. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Optimal Dynamic R&D Programs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 581-593, Winter.
  5. Carl Shapiro, 2004. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000539, David K. Levine.
  6. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  7. Reiko Aoki; Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 788, Econometric Society.
  8. Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring.
  9. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1981. "Dynamic games of innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 21-41, August.
  10. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring.
  11. Dosi, Giovanni, 1988. "Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 1120-71, September.
  12. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Daniel Quint, 2014. "Pooling with Essential and Nonessential Patents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 23-57, February.
  2. Nancy Gallini, 2011. "Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2011(3), pages 5-30.
  3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 342, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Ryan L. Lampe & Petra Moser, 2011. "Patent Pools and the Direction of Innovation - Evidence from the 19th-century Sewing Machine Industry," NBER Working Papers 17573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2011. "Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 443-454, July.
  6. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4429, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Agnès Vertier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.