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The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools

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Author Info
Reiko Aoki; Sadao Nagaoka

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Abstract

We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also examine the traditional RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing condition. We suggest formation, licensing and rent distribution methods more conducive to a successful patent pool operation

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 788.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:788

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Related research
Keywords: standards; consortium; patent pools;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Priest, George L, 1977. "Cartels and Patent License Arrangements," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 309-77, October.
  2. Barry Nalebuff, 2000. "Competing Against Bundles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm157, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  3. Belleflamme, Paul, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Efficient Patent Pools," IDEI Working Papers 211, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Dennis W. Carlton & Robert H. Gertner, 2002. "Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior," NBER Working Papers 8976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2008. ""Essential" Patents, FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards," ECARES Working Papers 2008_010, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dequiedt, V. & Versaevel, B., 2004. "Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D," Working Papers 200412, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2008. "Complementary Patents and Market Structure," Discussion Papers 249, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Patrick Gaulé, 2006. "Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?," CEMI Working Papers cemi-report-2006-010, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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