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Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G

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  • Aoki, Reiko
  • Nagaoka, Sadao

Abstract

We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders for a standard may not occur, despite significant gains for patent holders and users of the standard. Utilizing Maskin's (2003) framework, we show that a grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of patent holders (n) is small. When n is large, emergence of an outsider is inevitable, so that voluntary sequential negotiation cannot secure the socially efficient outcome. We also show that a firm specialized in research is more likely to become an outsider. We discuss the MPEG2, DVD and 3G patent pools in light of these results.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/15986/1/070iirWP05-01.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series IIR Working Paper with number 05-01.

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Length: 25, [2] p.
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:iirwps:05-01

Note: Presented to the Conference on IT Innovation, Tokyo, December 2004.
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Cited by:
  1. NAGAOKA Sadao & NISHIMURA Yoichiro, 2014. "Complementarity, Fragmentation, and the Effects of Patent Thickets," Discussion papers 14001, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 342, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Daniel Quint, 2014. "Pooling with Essential and Nonessential Patents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 23-57, February.
  4. Akifumi Ishihara & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2013. "Dark Sides of Patent Pools with Compulsory Independent Licensing," CARF F-Series CARF-F-318, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  5. Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2007. "Formation of a Pool with Essential Patents," Discussion Paper 326, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Daniel Quint, 2006. "Economics of Patent Pools When Some (but not all) Patents are Essential," Discussion Papers 06-028, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  7. Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno, 2013. "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 59-69.

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