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Exclusive Dealing Contracts by Distributors

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  • Ryoko Oki

    (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Noriyuki Yanagawa

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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    Abstract

    The existing literature about exclusive dealing contracts has focused on cases where an incumbent manufacturer o¤ers exclusive contracts to deter an entry. In contrast, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor o¤ers exclusive dealing contracts to deter an entry. Exclusive dealing contracts by a distributor are less e¤ective. We will show that the outcome of such contracts is quite di¤erent from the outcomes in the traditional literature. If the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently high, it is impossible to exclude an e¢ cient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two- part tari¤ contracts, the entrant distributor can enter the market for any number of manufacturers.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-789.

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    Length: 22pages
    Date of creation: Mar 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf789

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2002. "Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete," CEPR Discussion Papers 3493, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Julian Wright, 2009. "Exclusive Dealing and Entry, When Buyers Compete: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 1070-81, June.
    3. Abito, Jose Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2008. "Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 227-246, January.
    4. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo & Persson, Lars, 2005. "Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2002. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3547, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March.
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