Exclusive Dealing and the Market Power of Buyers
AbstractThis paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. The effectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts offered by distributors is quite different from those offered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has focused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived multiple equilibria within homogeneous price competition models. In contrast, this paper asserts that exclusive dealing contracts made by a distributor generate a unique equilibrium and that an efficient entrant must be excluded under the equilibrium as long as distributors have sufficient bargaining power.
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Date of creation: Jul 2010
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-07-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-07-17 (Industrial Competition)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
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"Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers,"
CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
153, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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