Exclusive Dealing Contracts by Distributors
AbstractThe existing literature about exclusive dealing contracts has focused on cases where an incumbent manufacturer offers exclusive contracts to deter an entry. In contrast, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor offers exclusive dealing contracts to deter an entry. Exclusive dealing contracts by a distributor are less effective. We will show that the outcome of such contracts is quite different from the outcomes in the traditional literature. If the number of manufacturers is sufficiently high, it is impossible to exclude an efficient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two- part tariff contracts, the entrant distributor can enter the market for any number of manufacturers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo in its series CARF F-Series with number CARF-F-243.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-03-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-03-12 (Industrial Competition)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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