The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition
AbstractThis paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms. Parties are shown to choose differentiated platforms in equilibrium when activists are present, despite factors drawing them together. Special-interest influence on platforms increases when a decline in activism stems from a fall in their motivation, following parties relying less upon them. This reduces procedural welfare, and potentially reduces voter welfare on policy outcomes, thus calling for more strict electoral laws.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 12-02.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
activism; special-interest politics; political participation; collective action; electoral competition; electoral financing laws; welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Nicolas-Guillaume Martineau, 2012. "The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3811, CESifo Group Munich.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-03-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-03-08 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, April.
- John Aldrich, 1983. "A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 63-100, January.
- Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2007.
"Redistributive Taxation under Ethical Behaviour,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 505-529, 09.
- Poutvaara, Panu, 2003.
" Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership,"
Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 79-98, October.
- Hannes Mueller, 2007. "Political Support and Candidate Choice," JEPS Working Papers 07-002, JEPS.
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