A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information
AbstractIn a model of competing managerial .rms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier theoretical contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 250.
Date of creation: 24 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Letters, Vol. 111, 256-259.
Asymmetric information; free entry; uncertainty; managerial firms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-05-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-05-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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