A Big Push to Deter Corruption: Evidence from Italy
AbstractDuring the first half of the 1990s a pool of Italian judges carried out an investigation, named Mani Pulite (literally clean hands), that led many public officials to be prosecuted and convicted because of bribery and embezzlement. The impact of Mani Pulite was so much influential that since then many indicators suggest a steadily decreasing path for corruption in Italy. This paper shows that Mani Pulite was mainly effective in deterring corruption as it broke up the feed due to spending in health and social security as well as infrastructure investments, mainly those related to public buildings, sanitation, and land reclamation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 159.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2006
Date of revision: 01 May 2008
Publication status: Published in Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 2008,n. 67(1), pages 75-102.
Corruption; Public Investment; Deterrence;
Other versions of this item:
- Antonio Acconcia & Claudia Cantabene, 2008. "A Big Push To Deter Corruption:Evidence From Italy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 67(1), pages 75-102, March.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2006-07-09 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-07-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-07-09 (Regulation)
- NEP-SOC-2006-07-09 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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