What Can We Learn From Simulating a Standard Agency Model?
AbstractFor typical parametrizations of the standard Holmstrom (1979) agency model, this paper demonstrates that the set of first-order conditions characterizing the optimal contract can be reduced to a single equation. A problem of investment financing under moral hazard is used to illustrate the reduced-form equation's usefulness in quantitative applications. When the agent has CARA preferences over consumption, it is shown that any exogenous limit on the penalties for low output is always binding.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 with number 98.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming, Economics Letters, 73 (2), pp. 136-147, November 2001
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/conference/SCE2001/SCE2001.html
More information through EDIRC
Moral Hazard; Numerical Analysis; Reduced-Form Equation; Limited Liability.;
Other versions of this item:
- Robe, Michel A., 2001. "What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 137-146, November.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C50 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - General
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October.
- Robe, Michel A., 1999. "Optimal vs. Traditional Securities under Moral Hazard," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(02), pages 161-189, June.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1997.
"Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1311-29, September.
- Mirrlees, James A., 1996. "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1996-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
- Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September.
- Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "The yield/quality trade-off and contractual choice," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6065, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Calcagno, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004.
"Capital Structure and Managerial Compensation: The Effects of Remuneration Seniority,"
2004-015, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Calcagno, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Capital Structure and Managerial Compensation: The Effects of Renumeration Seniority," Discussion Paper 2004-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Martinez, Jorge Rosell, 2010. "The Quality-Quantity Trade-off in the Principal-Agent Framework," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 11(1), January.
- Zsuzsanna Fluck & Kedran Garrison & Stewart C. Myers, 2005. "Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 11624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.