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Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible Bonds

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Author Info
André SCHMITT
Sandrine SPAETER
Abstract

In this paper, a manager borrows external funds in order to invest in production and also in prevention. The latter action must reduce the environmental risk driven by the activity of the firm. Prevention is observable neither by outside lenders nor by institutions such as environmental agencies for instance. In such a situation, we show that issuing convertible bonds - which permits the holder to exchange his bonds for a predetermined number of shares of the firm - from a limited liability firm could be a way to improve prevention compared to what can usually be done with standard debt. Such a relationship between the firm and the bank might be an alternative, or a complement, to the CERCLA legislation about extended liability which prevails in the United States and which is often discussed in Europe as a possible support of a more tightened European environmental legislation. We obtain an optimal convertible bond contract that induces more prevention and higher expected net revenues for the firm than standard debt. The expected social welfare is also improved. Finally, the economic implications of our findings are discussed.

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Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2002-14.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2002-14

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Related research
Keywords: Moral Hazard; Environmental Risk; Limited Liability; Prevention; Convertible Bond.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q29 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Other
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  3. Bascha, Andreas & Walz, Uwe, 2001. "Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 285-306, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  5. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Barnea, Amir & Haugen, Robert A & Senbet, Lemma W, 1980. " A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1223-34, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Dionne, Georges & Viala, Pascale, 1994. "Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 113-119, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta, 1999. "Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1291-1323, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. André SCHMITT & Sandrine SPAETER, 2004. "Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks," Working Papers of BETA 2004-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  2. André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, 2004. "Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2004-05, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
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