Posted Offer versus Bargaining: An Example of how Institutions can Facilitate Learning

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Posted Offer versus Bargaining: An Example of how Institutions can Facilitate Learning

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Koye Somefun

Abstract

This paper introduces a notion of learning as found in formal learning theory. This concept of learning enables us to investigate the idea that certain market institutions have the desirable property that they reduce the difficulty of adaptive learning, hence facilitating inductive reasoning. To exemplify this idea, we compare the popular market institutions of the posted offer selling mechanism and price bargaining. A seller of a durable consumer good who enjoys relative monopoly power characterizes both market institutions. The seller offers the good for sale for an infinite number of consecutive trading periods. At the beginning of every trading period she has to determine the price and the quality for the good offered where the profits realized in the past guide her choice, i.e., profit serves as the measure of success. Loosely put, the question then is which market institution better facilitates inductive reasoning.

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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 with number 79.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:79

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2001-05-02 (All new papers)

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Peter Diamond, 1985. "Search Theory," Working papers 389, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Other versions:
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