Point-Rationalizability in Large Games
AbstractIn this paper, I characterize point-rationalizability in large non-anonymous games with three di erent formulations of societal responses, and also propose an implicit dynamic process that is informed by Guesnerie's eductive notions. Given the introspection and 'mentalizing' that the point-rationalizability notions presuppose, a motivation behind the work is to examine their viability in situations where the terms rationality and full information can be given a more parsimonious, and thereby more analytically viable, expression.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ryerson University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 030.
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Large games; Nash equilibria; point-rationalizability; closed under rational behavior (curb); societal response; distribution; integration; transformed statistics.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-09-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-09-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-03 (Microeconomics)
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